Introduction
The financial crisis has put the global and European financial stability architectures to a momentous test. In particular, the crisis has highlighted ke y features of the financial market landscape, which had been possibly underestimated and need to be addressed by a new structure for financial regulation and supervision. Such features include the increasing relevance of systemic risk stemming from structu ral developments related to financial integration and financial innovation, as well as the close links between the financial system and the real economy. As a result, the crisis largely materialised out of mutually reinforcing dynamics between macroeconomi c conditions, structural changes, and the specific vulnerabilities linked to individual institutions. These dynamics were not * Fabio Recine is Senior Expert and Pedro Gustavo Teixeira is Adviser at the Directorate Financial Stability and Supervision of the European Central Bank, as well as Lecturer at the Institute for Law and Finance, Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt/M. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB. Comments are welcome to fabio.recine@ecb.europa.eu and pedro_gustavo.teixeira@ecb.europa.eu sufficiently captured by the regulatory and supervisory system. Therefore, the crisis reinforced the view that the safeguarding of financial stability requires an effective combination of micro and macro-prudential approaches to regulation and supervision. October 2009. The structure of this article is as follows. The first Section will describe the evolution of the financial stability framework in the EU. The second Section will refer to the main lessons from the crisis and the regulatory reforms taking place. The third and fourth sections will focus on the features of the ESRB and ESFS, respectively. The fifth section will identify the main challenges for the new architecture to work effectively.
The evolution of the European financial stability framework
The development of the financial stability framework in the EU can essentially be traced back to 1985, the year in which the single market approach to financial services was introduced with the Commission's White Paper. 6 The 1985 White Paper was the culmination of a number of economic, political and legal factors which provided the conditions for progress in European fi nancial market integration. It represented the political willingness for undertaking economic reform, namely in the direction of market liberalisation and further market integration within the Community.
The 1985 White Paper put forward three key principl es of legal and market integration. First, the principle of home-country control, according to which the primary task of regulating a financial institution and its branches established in host countries would be entrusted to the authorities of the Member State of origin. The financial institution would, therefore, only report to its home-country authorities regarding both domestic and crossborder provision of services directly or through branches.
The second principle was the mutual recognition by Member States and their respective authorities of the regulatory regimes and practices of each other. Financial institutions would be free to provide financial services directly or through branches in the jurisdiction of host Member States, subject to the laws, regulation and supervision of the homecountry. For host-countries, this would imply recognising that the safeguard of the public interests underlying financial regulation in their jurisdictions -such as depositor and investor protection, and financial stability -would be adequately pursued by the homecountry authorities.
Third, home-country control and mutual recognition would be supported by the minimum harmonisation of national laws, which would set the standards regarding authorisation, The cross-border provision of financial services would be facilitated essentially through the extension of the Cassis de Dijon doctrine from industrial and agricultural products under Article 28 (ex Article 30) EEC Treaty to the free circulation of "financial products" throughout the Community. would provide a single passport to financial institutions for the provision of services throughout the Community.
9
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 set out the framework for EMU and the creation of the single currency, involving the establishment of the ECB and the ESCB. 10 The introduction of the euro implied the establishment of the first federal regulatory structure of the Community through the full transfer of competences on mone tary policy to the ECB and the ESCB. This move towards federalisation was based on the realisationdiagnosed in the 1989 Delors Report -that the development of the single market necessitated more effective co-ordination of economic policy between nation al authorities, as there was a fundamental incompatibility between (i) full freedom of capital, (ii) freedom to provide cross-border financial services, (iii) fixed exchange rate under ERM, and (iv) autonomous monetary policy. The implementation of the single passport concept was made possible by the Single European Act (SEA) of 1985, which committed Member States to achieving a single market by 1992. First, the SEA placed the free movement of capital at the same level as that of goods and services, providing the basis for Directive 88/361, which established the basic principle of free movement of capital as directly enforceable as a matter of Community law, both between Member States and with third countries. Second, the SEA lifted the unanimity requirement and introduced voting by qualified majority for the adoption by the Council of harmonisation measures for the achievement of the internal market. In addition the SEA also subjected the legislation on internal market to newly introduced "co-operation procedure", according to which the Parliament would be consulted by the Council on such legislation. Lastly, the SEA formally recognised the possibility of comitology procedures as a condition that the Council may set for the exercise by the Commission of delegated powers. among authorities, and (5) a template for a Systemic Assessment Framework, offering a common methodology to assess the systemic implications of a crisis.
14 In addition to the MoU, EU-wide cooperation for safeguarding financial stability is based on a number of EU committees. These include: (1) the Financial Stability Table of the Economic and Financial Committee, which meets at least twice a year (spring and autumn) in order to prepare a financial stab ility assessment for the ECOFIN; (2) the Financial Services Committee, comprising finance ministries' representatives, which also provides advice to the ECOFIN; (3) the Banking Supervision Committee of the ESCB, which monitors financial sector developments from a financial stability perspective and promotes cooperation between national central banks, supervisory authorities and the ECB; and (4) the Level 3 Committees (CEBS, CESR and CEIOPS) , which also regularly offer an assessment of the risks to financia l stability in the EU.
In conclusion, the European arrangements for safeguarding financial stability were based on the guiding principle that a decentralised institutional setting mostly based on the exercise of national responsibilities would be able to prevent and manage crises affecting the single financial market. The national authorities of home -and host-country authorities would cooperate in the management of a crisis on the basis of Community legislation and non-binding agreements such as Memorandum of Understanding.
However, also due to the potential impact on national fiscal responsibilities, national authorities would preserve full responsibility and discretion in the actions to take to manage a crisis situation.
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The lessons of the financial crisis in Europe
The financial crisis unfolded in Europe in July 2007 with the first reports of sub -prime related losses suffered by the European banks and in August 2007 with the freezing of interbank markets. 16 The crisis involved a number of significant events of financial instability which included a loss of confidence in the soundness of European banks, bank-runs, the prospect of failure of cross-border and domestic financial institutions which required recapitalisation measures, 17 and even the financial collapse of an entire country which was part of the EU single financial market as a member of the EEA. 17 The definition provided by Reinhart and Rogoff of a financial crisis is useful in this context: "one of two types of events: (i) bank runs that lead to closure, merger or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial institutions, (ii) in the absence of runs, closure, merger, takeover or large -scale government assistance of an important financial institution (or group of institutions) that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other financial institutions". See C. Reinhart, and K Rogoff (2008), Banking crises: an equal opportunity menace, NBER Working Paper, no 14587.
These events revealed inadequacies in the institutional and regulatory frameworks to safeguard the stability of domestic financial systems and of the sing le financial market as a whole. The main lessons that are being drawn for the European financial stability arrangements may be summarised as follows.
First, the financial crisis has challenged fundamental assumptions regarding the functioning and expansion of the single financial market. It highlighted in particular the so-called "trilemma of financial stability" according to which (1) a stable financial system, (2) an integrated financial system and (3) national financial autonomy are incompatible. 18 The incompatibility derives basically from the fact that the single financial market was constructed in a setting where market integration is managed on the basis of homehost-country relationships and where the economic benefits of integration are spread and shared among Member States. Conversely the common economic risks stemming from the increased financial integration are not mutualised but rather dealt with on the basis of national responsibilities, as regulators and governments remain only accountable to national parliaments and taxpayers. 19 Therefore, the framework of the single financial market implies that as market integration increases, the common economic risks expand and need to be address as a matter of common concern among Member States. As an evidence of this, Member States took coordinated actions to jointly support the single financial market at the euro area summit of Heads of State in Paris on 12 October 2008. Looking forward, this implies that the framework for financial stability has to be continuously enhanced to address such risks, particularly when the degree of market integration leads to significant cross -border spillovers in the case of a crisis.
Second, the crisis demonstrated the need for an adequate macro -prudential supervision of the financial system. In particular, the crisis demonstrated the importance of monitoring, assessing and mitigating the risks to the financial system as a whole that may derive from the collective behaviour of financial institutions, their interaction in financial markets and from the close links between the financial system and the macroeconomy. In this context, the crisis has shown that the nature and magnitude of the systemic risk in the financial sector is related not only to the potential illiquidity or insolvency of large banks or other major regulated financial institutions, but it also depends on the degree of "interconnectedness" or "interdependence" between financial institutions and between markets. Therefore, the introduction of macro -prudential In particular, the cross-border distribution and propagation of systemic risk needs to be monitored addressed by appropriate structures. At the global leve l, the Financial 
Lastly, the crisis demonstrated that an effective financial safety net for the operation of the single European financial market requires a more extensive convergence and harmonisation of national arrangements, also in matters deeply rooted in Member
States' legal systems. This includes areas such as deposit guarantee schemes, early intervention tools, and bank resolution regimes.
These lessons are reflected in the series of comprehensive reviews which are taking place at the national and European levels to enhance the legal and regulatory system for financial stability. Report, acknowledges the limitations of the institutional and legal architecture of the single financial market which were made evident by the crisis. In order to enhance the European framework, the de Larosière Report contains a comprehensive set of recommendations at the EU level covering: (1) F inancial regulation and international cooperation, with recommendations covering a wide range of areas, including Basel II, accounting rules, credit rating agencies, Solvency 2, hedge funds, securitised products and derivatives, investment funds, corporate governance, internal risk management of financial institutions (Recommendations 1-12); (2) Financial crisis management, with recommendations covering a framework for managing crises, the further harmonisation of deposit-guarantee schemes, and the need for Member States to agree on more detailed criteria for burden sharing than those contained in the existing Memorandum of Understanding, which should be amended accordingly (Recommendations 13-15); and (3) The European supervisory framework, with proposals for the setting-up of a two-pillar structure for the EU regulatory and supervisory architecture. In particular, it proposes to distinguish at the EU level the conduct of macro-from micro-prudential supervision through the establishment of two distinct structures. 
The European System of Financial Supervision
The de Larosière Report identified a number of weaknesses relating to the conduct of financial supervision at the EU level. 31 Such weaknesses included issues relating to (1) supervisory failures with regard to individual institutions; (2) the impossibility to challenge supervisory practices on a cross-border basis; (3) the lack of frankness and cooperation between supervisors; (4) the lack of consistent powers across Member
States; (5) the lack of recourses in the Level 3 Committees; and (6) the lack of means for supervisors to take common decisions. This Committee should also aim at ensuring supervisory consistency across sectors. In this context, there will be a Subcommittee to deal specifically with cross -sectoral issues, including financial conglomerates.
Figure 2: the European System for Financial Supervision (ESFS)
Current institutional setting ESFS
Coordination of the three committees on the basis of a Joint Protocol The establishment of the ESFS is expected to enhance significantly the framework for financial supervision in the EU. In particular, the ESFS will have the objectives of (1) improving the coordination of cross border supervision, including through colleges of supervisors and ensuring consistent superviso ry decisions across borders; (2) raising the quality of financial regulation across the EU, including through a consistent application of rules and the development of a single EU rulebook; (3) improving crisis prevention, coordination and management across the EU as a whole; and (4) improving the effectiveness and efficiency of supervision.
In order to fulfil these objectives, the new European Supervisory Authorities will take on all the tasks of the existing supervisory committees -CEBS, CEIOPS and CESR -and in addition have significantly increased responsibilities, defined legal powers and greater authority than the committees. According to the Commission's proposals, the tasks and powers of the Authorities will include the following.
First, the Authorities will issue technical standards with the aim of identifying and removing differences among national financial regulations, which may stem from exceptions and derogations allowed under Community law. This should allow developing a harmonised core set of standards across the EU, which will provide as much as a possible a single rulebook for participants in the single financial market. In order for standards to be as effective as possible, the Commission will endorse them as Community law, thus providing for binding legal effect at the EU level.
Second, they will issue guidelines and recommendations that contribute to ensuring coherent application of Community legislation. These guidelines and recommendations will not have a legally binding nature, but nati onal supervisors will have an interest in complying with them in order to provide a level playing field for market participants. The
Authorities will conduct periodical peer reviews of national supervisors' activities in order to enhance consistency in supervisory practices.
Third, the Authorities may also issue recommendations to specific national supervisors, particularly when a specific supervisor is considered to be diverging from the existing Community legislation, including the technical standards. Th is will therefore represent a mechanism for supporting the compliance with the Authorities' instruments.
Fourth, the Authorities will be expected to play a coordination role in financial crisis situations -which are defined as adverse developments which may seriously jeopardise the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the Community. In particular, they will be expected to promote a coordinated Community response by facilita ting the exchange of information between supervisors, determining the scope and verifying the reliability of relevant information, acting as mediator between supervisors, and notifying the European Systemic Risk Board of any potential emergency situation. In this context, the Authorities may adopt decisions requiring national supervisors to take an appropriate action to address the risks in the crisis situation. The types of action that may be taken will be defined in Community legislation. Furthermore, if a national supervisor does not comply with the decision, the Authorities may adopt a decision directed at a specific financial institution requiring it to comply with the relevant Community legislation.
Fifth, the Authorities will contribute to the effici ent and consistent functioning of colleges of supervisors. The Authorities may participate as observers in colleges and receive all relevant information shared between the members of the college. In addition, the Authorities will have the task to collect information for national supervisors in order to facilitate the work of colleges. In this context, the Authorities will have the obligation to establish and manage a central database to make information available to the national supervisors involved in colleges.
Sixth, the Authorities will have the general task of contributing to consistent supervision across the EU. In addition to the tools of technical standards, guidelines, and recommendations, the Authorities may, in case of disagreements among national supervisors on cooperation, coordination or joint decision -making, take a decision, after an attempt for conciliation, requiring the national supervisors to take or refrain from taking action. Moreover, the Authorities can also facilitate the delegation o f tasks among supervisors, and generally support a common supervisory culture through opinions, reviews, and training programmes.
Seventh, the Authorities will be able to collect information from supervisors and other public authorities of Member States necessary to carry out their tasks.
Lastly, the Authorities will be responsible for monitoring and assessing market developments, particularly with regard to the relevant micro -prudential trends, potential risks and vulnerabilities. For this purpose, the Au thorities shall conduct stress-testing exercises, in cooperation with the ESRB. The outcome of such monitoring and assessment should be conveyed to the ESRB, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. In addition to these tasks, which are common to all Authorities, the ESMA will have supervisory powers for credit rating agencies. Such powers could include the power to request information and to conduct investigations or on -site inspections and, in addition, such as the possibility to withdraw the registration or suspend the use for regulatory purposes of credit ratings The responsibilities of ESMA in this regard will be possibly defined in an amendment to the Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies.
The framework proposed by the Commission for the European Supervisory Authorities implies that national supervisors will continue carrying out day -to-day supervision, also on the basis of colleges of supervisors, which will be set up for all major cross -border institutions. Accordingly, the tasks and powers of the new Authorities are largely of a coordinating nature which falls short of a federal architecture such as the one of the ECB and the Eurosystem. In the words of the de Larosière Report, the new "European System for Financial Supervision would be a largely decentralised structure, fully respecting the proportionality and subsidiarity principles of the Treaty. So existing national supervisors, who are closest to the markets and institutions they supervise, would continue to carry-out day-to-day supervision and preserve the majority of their present competences." Council shall, within two months, decide whether the decision should be maintained or revoked, acting by qualified majority.
In conclusion, the setting proposed by the Commission for the ESFS and the three European Supervisory Authorities should enhance significantly the financial regulation and supervision at the EU level. This will be achieved by attributing to the Authorities a set of tasks and powers, which will be conducive essential ly to (1) a single EU rulebook for market participants, (2) better coordination at the EU level between national supervisors, (3) improved exchange and collection of information relevant for microprudential supervision, and (4) improving the ability of th e EU as a whole to respond to a financial crisis situation.
The European Systemic Risk Board
The de Larosière Report recommended the establishment of a European Systemic Risk
Council (ESRC) with the responsibility for conducting macro -prudential supervision. The report recommended in particular three main design features for the ESRC. First, macro-prudential supervision should concern all the financial sector and not only banks.
Second, macro-prudential supervision should take a wide EU perspective, and ta ke also into account the judgements made by the authorities of individual Member States. Third, 35 See paragraphs 184 of the de Larosière Report.
there must be an effective and enforceable mechanism to translate the assessment of risks identified by macro-prudential analysis into specific supervisory acti ons. In this context, the ESRC would have the tasks to "form judgements and make recommendations on macro-prudential policy, issue risk warnings, compare observations on macro-economic and prudential developments and give direction on these issues".
The de Larosière Report acknowledged that central banks have a key role to play in a macro-prudential framework in view of their role and interest in safeguarding the stability of the financial system as a whole. Central banks' focus on systemic stability puts them in a position to better assess not only the likelihood and the potential impact of macroshocks or disturbances in domestic and international capital markets, but also the operation of common factors affecting the stability of groups and intermediarie s.
Accordingly, the ESRC would be primarily composed of the members of the General Council of the ECB, and the ESRC would be set-up under the auspices of the ECB. On the basis of the Commission's legislative proposals, which will be subject to the Community's legislative procedure, the ESRB will have the following distinguishing features.
First, the ESRB will be set up as an independent EU body without legal personality -in contrast to the European Supervisory Authorities, which will have legal personalityresponsible for macro-prudential oversight of the EU financial system.
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Second, in order to fulfil its mission, the ESRB will be entrusted with a set of tasks, which will include (1) the collection and analysis of information , (2) the identification and prioritisation of systemic risks, (3) the issuance of warnings where risks are deemed to be significant, (4) the issuance of recommendations for remedial action, (5) the monitoring of the follow-up to warnings and recommendations, (6) the cooperation and exchange of information with the ESFS, and (7) provide data that are not in summary or collective form. In this case, the ESRB should consult the relevant European Supervisory Authority in order to ensure that the request is proportionate.
Sixth, and most importantly, the ESRB will have the power and obligation to issue risk warnings and recommendations. Warnings or recommendations issued by the ESRB may be either of a general or specific nature . They may be addressed to the Community as a whole or to one or more Member States, or to one or more of the European Supervisory Authorities, or to one or more national supervisors. Recommendations may also be addressed to the Commission in respect of the relevant Community legislation.
In the case of recommendations, they should sp ecify a timeline for the policy response.
The addressees will have the obligation to communicate to the ESRB their policy response or to explain why they have not acted ("act or explain" mechanism). If the ESRB decides that its recommendation has not been followed and that the addressees have failed to explain their inaction appropriately, it shall inform the Council and, where relevant, the European Supervisory Authorities concerned.
The degree of effectiveness of the risk warnings and recommendations will be a crucial aspect of the functioning and credibility of the macro -prudential tasks to be exercised by the ESRB. In particular, the ESRB will have no legally-binding powers to ensure compliance by the addressees of risk warnings and recommendations. Ther efore, it will need to rely on a combination of (i) solid technical analysis, (ii) institutional and policy credibility, and (iii) peer pressure as the sources of its legitimacy.
In this context, the ESRB could rely on the combination of five main tools and mechanisms. Firstly, the active monitoring by the ESRB on the extent to which its policy recommendations are implemented and the mitigating effects of such implemen tation on the identified risks.
Secondly, the regular reporting to the ECOFIN of the out come of such monitoring, in order to raise attention and foster action by policy-makers.
Thirdly, the "act or explain" principle, according to which the addressees of ESRB recommendations will be required to take the appropriate remedial action or justify the reasons why they have not acted.
Fourthly, the close cooperation with the European Supervisory Authorities, particularly to support the implementation of recommendations addressed to one or more competent national supervisory authorities. In particular, the European Supervisory
Authorities will be required to use their powers to ensure a timely follow -up.
Furthermore, when a national supervisor does not follow -up, it has to inform the Board of Supervisors of the respective ESA. In its reply to the ESRB, the national supervisor has to take into account the input of the respective ESA.
Lastly, the right of the ESRB to decide to publish its risk warnings and/or recommendations on a case by case basis, which may increase the pressure for the prompt corrective actions. Given the sensitiveness of such a publication, it will be expected the decision of the ESRB would be taken on an exceptional basis, when serious threats to financial stability are not being addressed to the extent necessary.
The appropriate c ombination of these tools and mechanisms, which will be contemplated in the Community legislation establishing the new European financial stability architecture, will provide an adequate institutional framework for ensuring the effectiveness of the risk warnings and policy recommendations of the ESRB.
Overall, the proposed establishment of the ESRB will considerably enhance the current financial stability framework as it will allow, in particular: (1) overcoming the current lack of an integrated financial stability assessment at the EU level covering the whole financial sector; (2) translating financial stability assessments into risk warnings and policy recommendations for EU and national authorities; (iii) exploit ing at the EU level the central banking, as well as supervisory, analytical capabilities and expertise in financial stability and macroeconomic analysis. 2 Issuance of recommendations with a specified ti meline for policy response addressed to the Community as a whole, to one or more Member States, to one or more of the European Supervisory Authorities, or to one or more national supervisors, and also to the Commission in respect of Community legislation.
3 Publication of risk warnings and recommendations
Outlook: implementation challenges
The setting-up of the ESFS and of the ESRB will enhance significantly the EU financial stability architecture. 41 The proposed two-pillar framework for micro-prudential and macro-prudential supervision poses a number of challenges in its implementation.
The first challenge regards the appropriate interplay between the macro-and the microprudential pillars. The aim of the proposed architecture is that the focus of the work of the ESRB will be macro, aggregate, systemic and economic in outlook, while the work of the micro-ESFS will be micro, prudential, and regulatory. In this context, it is important to achieve the right synergies between the micro-and macro-prudential functions in safeguarding financial stability, also in order to avoid overlaps and duplication. As analysed above, the Commission's proposals include a number of provisions which aim at ensuring an adequate ongoing cooperation and sharing of information between the ESRB and ESFS, as well as the support of the ESFS in the implementation of the ESRB recommendations.
A second challenge relates to the effective translation of macro-prudential analysis into policy actions.
The financial crisis has demonstrated that ther e was an inadequate translation of risk warnings provided by different fora and central banks into concrete policy actions. Financial stability assessments were often formulated in broad terms and on the basis of alternative benign and less-benign scenarios and outcomes.
Furthermore, assessments were made with a view to developing the knowledge and raising the awareness of authorities, the financial industry, and the public at large with regard to potential sources of risks and vulnerabilities to the financ ial system. They were not made with the specific aim of identifying the appropriate policy and regulatory actions to safeguard financial stability. The effectiveness of the two -pillar approach in the proposed supervisory framework will require the establis hment of mechanisms and procedures that would ensure that the advice concerning corrective actions that aim at containing risks and vulnerabilities is duly reflected in EU and national policies.
A third challenge is to set-up appropriate cooperation and coordination structures between macro-and micro-prudential functions also in crisis situations. The crisis has
shown that that crisis prevention, crisis management and crisis resolution tools should be reinforced and be handled in a consistent regulatory framework. In addition, the crisis has made it evident that resolving a crisis involving cross -border EU institutions is challenging due to the different supervisory, crisis management and resolution tools as well as differences and inconsistencies in national legislation regarding company and insolvency laws. The proposed supervisory framework will not solve these differences as long as the differences in national legislation are not resolved, and issues such as deposit guarantee schemes and burden sharing are not addressed at the EU level.
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A final main challenge is to ensure the interaction with international bodies and structures. The financial crisis has underscored the importance of concerted policy responses on a global level. To that end, the IMF and the Financial Stability Board are expected to play a key role in the early identification and assessment of risks and vulnerabilities, the issuance of risk warnings, and the adoption of the related macroprudential policies at the global level. In this re spect, the interplay between the European macro-prudential supervisory body and the IMF/FSB will be an important element.
Conclusion
Taken as a whole, the Commission proposals inspired on the de Larosière Report provide an innovative and complete bluepri nt for enhancing and reinforcing the EU architecture for financial supervision. They provide a good response for addressing the issues highlighted by the crisis as regards the need for further enhancements of the existing arrangements, reflecting the incre asing financial integration in the EU.
The setting-up of the ESFS should significantly strengthen the coordination and convergence of supervisory standards and practices at the EU level, while retaining national responsibilities for direct supervision of institutions.
The proposed establishment of the ESRB would allow enhancing substantially the scope of financial stability assessments at the EU level. In addition, the proposed role of the ESRB acknowledges the contribution already provided by central ban ks in the monitoring and assessment of financial risks and vulnerabilities, therefore fully exploiting the synergies with their activities and resources.
A key condition for the efficient and effective functioning of this new two-pillar structure is to ensure an appropriate interplay between the EU macro -prudential function - 
